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Mindfulness-Based Stress Reduction meditation (MBSR) may offer optimal performance
through heightened attention for increased body consciousness. To test this hypothesis,
MBSR effects were assessed on the simple task of lifting an object. A dual task para-
digm was included to assess the opposite effect of a limited amount of attention on motor
consciousness. In a stimulus-based condition, the subjects’ task was to lift an object that
was hefted with weights. In an intentional-based condition, subjects were required to lift
a light object while imagining that the object was virtually heavier and thus, adjust their
grip voluntarily. The degree of motor consciousness was evaluated by calculating correla-
tion factors for each participant between the grip force level used during the lift trial (“lift
the object”) and that used during its associated reproduce trial (“without lifting, indicate
the force you think you used in the previous trial”). Under dual task condition, motor con-
sciousness decreased for intention- and stimulus-based actions, revealing the importance
of top-down attention for building the motor representation that guides action planning. For
MBSR-experts, heightened attention provided stronger levels of motor consciousness; this
was true for both intention and stimulus-based actions. For controls, heightened attention
decreased the capacity to reproduce force levels, suggesting that voluntary top-down atten-
tion interfered with the automatic bottom-up emergence of body sensations. Our results
provide strong arguments for involvement of two types of attention for the emergence of
motor consciousness. Bottom-up attention would serve as an amplifier of motor-sensory
afferences; top-down attention would help transfer the motor-sensory content from a pre-
conscious to a conscious state of processing. MBSR would be a specific state for which
both types of attention are optimally combined to provide experts with total experiences
of their body in movement.
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INTRODUCTION
Mental skills are crucial in ensuring great performances at world
championships and Olympic Games (Werthner, 2002). The often-
referenced study by Orlick and Partington (1988), an extensive
study of 235 Canadian athletes, revealed that mental readiness
was a significant factor in determining which athletes were able
to perform their best under the pressures and stresses of the
Olympics. The ability to focus attention and control performance
imagery was later found to be the key factors in successful per-
formances (Werthner, 2002). What a person directs his or her
attention to while preparing to execute a skill determines in fact
how fluid the motion, how consistent the movement and in gen-
eral, how accurate the outcome is (for a review, see Wulf et al.,
2010b).
In the past 20 years, mindfulness-based stress reduction
(MBSR) meditation has been adopted by many athletes especially
those evolving in individual sports for which self-awareness of
body performance is a key to success (skiing, gymnastics, swim-
ming). Acquired through long periods of months, some athletes
are convinced of its usefulness for filtering in only those positive
thoughts needed for the task at hand, thus augmenting concentra-
tion capacities. Others are more sensitive to the role of mindfulness
to heighten the sensory experiences of their body during perfor-
mance execution. The aim of the present study was to develop a
simple lab-based methodology to assess objectively the effects of
mindfulness meditation through the manipulation of the nature of
the task (automatic vs. controlled) and of the quantity of available
attention (simple vs. dual task) during the planning of a simple
grip to lift action. More specifically, we wanted to gain a better
understanding of the role played by meditation for the alloca-
tion of attention resources in relation to the emergence of the
consciousness of body in action.
MEDITATION FOR HEIGHTENED MOTOR ATTENTION
Even if grip force (GF) is a motor parameter that is scaled auto-
matically, it appears that during some fine manipulative tasks
(e.g., threading a needle), we can make a conscious effort to
orient more attention to modulate muscle contraction output
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(Delevoye-Turrell and Wing, 2004). As such, it is possible to
increase our levels of body consciousness of even the smallest
body part (while reading this sentence, orient in the present moment
your attention to your left big toe. . .). With practice, it has been
shown that body consciousness can become so vivid and intense
that certain experts report having experienced what is called the
flow state of consciousness – an optimal performance state that is
most searched for by athletes (Bianco et al., 1999) and by music
maestros (Glise, 2011). During flow state, the modified state of
attention can increase body consciousness to such an extent that
performers experience loss of temporal awareness, a calm loss of
emotional and physical tension as well as an increase sensitivity
to sound, light, and tactile stimuli (Williams and Krane, 1993).
Because of these observations, it has been suggested that MBSR
meditation techniques may help individuals gain control on those
brain mechanism leading to the emergence of the flow state of
body consciousness.
In current research contexts, MBSR meditation is typically
defined as non-judgmental attention to experiences in the present
moment (Shapiro et al., 2008). Bishop et al. (2004) have suggested a
two-component model of mindfulness where the first component
is the regulation of attention in order to maintain it on the imme-
diate experience, and the second component involves approach-
ing one’s experiences with an orientation of curiosity, openness,
and acceptance. As such, the practice of mindfulness meditation
encompasses paying attention on purpose, in the present moment,
on the experience of thoughts, emotions, and body sensations simply
observing them as they arise and pass away (Kabat-Zinn, 1994).
Attentional training and improvement are in fact core elements in
traditional meditation practices, and meditation types are often
defined according to their attentional characteristics (Andresen,
2000; Lutz et al., 2008).
Nevertheless, it is also known that paying “too much attention”
to our movements can disrupt performance, especially if the skill
is well practiced and performed following an automatic routine
(Flegal and Anderson, 2008). For example, being conscious of our
feet when quickly walking down a flight of stairs can make one trip
and fall. There is hardly an athlete, a musician, or a public speaker
who could not give an example of “chocking,” especially when he
or she was trying hard to concentrate and do well (Beilock et al.,
2002). It is thus possible that heightened attention to body move-
ments through MBSR techniques may be good for certain types of
movements only.
TWOMODES OF ACTION PLANNING FOR ADAPTED INTERACTION
WITH THE WORLD
It is the case that there are two principal ways in which one can
interact with the environment. One may carry out movements to
manipulate the environment in order to produce desired environ-
mental effects. In such an intentional state, one may grasp a plastic
cup to squash it intentionally before placing it in the bin. In such
intention-guided case, the force level applied through the finger-
tips is increased voluntarily to reach the desired state of a flattened
cup. On another hand, actions may be carried out to accommo-
date environmental demands: grasp the cup to move it and make
place for a hot dish. In this stimulus-driven case, the force level
applied through the fingertips is increased automatically, without
further thought. There is now convincing scientific evidence that
intention-guided actions, on the one hand, and stimulus-driven
actions, on the other hand, are controlled by different neural-
psychological pathways (Herwig et al., 2007; Tubau et al., 2007;
Casal et al., 2009).
The activity of these pathways has been shown to rely on
different kinds of memory traces (Elsner and Hommel, 2001).
The stimulus-based control mode represents a case of a “pre-
pared reflex” (Hommel, 2000), for which the cognitive system is
prepared to respond to particular, typically highly response com-
patible stimuli in a more or less automatic fashion. Accordingly,
not much of the sequence is actually learned and little attention
resources are thought to be required. In contrast, actions following
an internal desire will produce a selected series of actions, and it has
been suggested that the intention-based control mode relies on the
construction of an action plan (Luria, 1962; Maasen et al., 2003),
which consists in the planning of ordered sequences of represen-
tations of action effects (Hommel, 1996). Intention-based control
implies that plan-related representations (i.e., action-triggering
signals) are internally generated (Zelazo et al., 1999) and as such,
require attention for optimal preparation and fluent execution.
CONTRASTING LEVELS OF MOTOR ATTENTION IN FUNCTION OF
ACTION MODE
To gain a direct insight on exactly what aspects of movement plan-
ning or executing required attention resources, we used a dual task
paradigm to probe the levels of attention needed for gripping
actions (Delevoye-Turrell et al., 2006). In an implicit scaling con-
dition (stimulus-driven), subjects were required to reach for an
object and move it across the table. Because there was an objective
to the task, the subjects’ focus of attention was oriented toward
the final goal of the task and thus, GF was automatically scaled
to the object’s weight. In the explicit scaling condition (intention-
based), the subjects’ task was to reach for the object and grip it
harder, i.e., increase explicitly the level of GF applied to the sur-
faces of the object. An auditory probe could occur before or during
action execution, and subjects were instructed to react as fast as
possible to the probe (with their foot) without interrupting the
hand-task. This dual task paradigm provided the means to evalu-
ate the amount of attention used for motor planning (with a probe
that occurred between the start of the trial and movement onset)
and for motor execution (with a probe that occurred during the
movement) as a proportion of reaction time augmentation (Kah-
neman, 1973). Results showed that there was a significant increase
in reaction times for all types of actions under dual task compared
to single task conditions, suggesting that all grip actions required
a minimal amount of attention both for planning and execution.
Nevertheless, less attention was overall required for the planning of
stimulus-driven actions compared to that used for intention-based
actions.
Following the idea that more attention should lead to increased
levels of motor consciousness (i.e., the explicit knowledge of phys-
ical responses), we predicted in the present study that intention-
based actions would be associated to a higher level of motor con-
sciousness compared to stimulus-driven actions. Under the effects
of MBSR meditation, motor consciousness should be maximal as
subjects focus more attention resources during action planning
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and execution, with however lower reproducing capacities in the
stimulus-based mode of action planning. Finally, because atten-
tion is required for even the simplest gripping task, the decrease
in attention availability (through the use of a dual task paradigm)
should impair the levels reached of motor consciousness by all our
participants in both modes of action planning.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
PARTICIPANTS
Participants were recruited in the different departments of the
University of Lille3 (psychology; musicology; arts) and at the
symphony orchestra of Lille (Orchestre Nationale de Lille). They
were divided in two groups in function of their knowledge and
expertise in mindfulness MBSR meditation technique. The group
of MBSR-experts were 10 right-handed professional or amateur
musicians who practiced daily mindfulness meditation (six males;
mean age 40.8 years, SD 11.2, range 23.6–56.2; years of education
14.9, SD 2.6). The mean level of mindfulness meditation experi-
ence was high (mean period of 12.2 years, SD 5.2, range 3.0–23.5).
Twenty right-handed professional or amateur musicians (eight
males; mean age 36.0 years, SD 16.1, range 19.3–62.4; years of
education 13.9, SD 3.0) also took part in this study as controls;
none had any experience in mindfulness meditation. There were
no statistical differences between Groups for Age [t (1, 28)= 0.841;
p= 0.407], years of education [t (1, 28)= 0.898; p= 0.379], and
years of musical practice [t (1, 28)= 0.871; p= 0.436]. All subjects
were naïve to the specific purpose of the experiment.
None of the participants had any known psychological or neu-
rological deficits. They had normal or corrected-to-normal vision.
The local ethics committee approved the experimental proto-
col and all participants provided written informed consent after
the procedure had been fully explained. Participants were tested
individually, in an isolated room and participated in a single
experimental session lasting approximately 45-min.
APPARATUS
Subjects were seated facing a table on which was placed an object.
With their dominant right hand, subjects used a precision grip
with thumb on one side opposed by three fingers to lift and
hold the object (weight: 65 g) that had metal-surfaced plates (see
Figure 1). A circular load cell (TIA Mini 40 Force/Torques trans-
ducer; weight: 50 g; diameter: 40 mm; width: 15 mm) was mounted
within this object to measure the GF (in Newton) produced by the
digits normal to the vertical grasp surfaces. This six-axis load cell
also provided the means to measure load force fluctuations (LF in
Newton) that acted tangential to the object’s surfaces, induced by
gravity. The load cell was connected to a laptop computer and the
data collection was run through custom-made Labview software
at a sampling frequency of 1000 Hz.
EXPERIMENTAL PROCEDURE
On each trial, participants were required to lift the object and hold
it immobile, in mid air, for approximately 3 s (Figure 1 – left).
After this LIFT trial, they were instructed to reproduce the GF
level they thought they had used on the previous trial to hold the
object in mid air (Figure 1 – right). For this REPRODUCE trial,
participants were required to maintain the object on the table,
FIGURE 1 | Pictures of a subject during the LIFT and REPRODUCE-trials
for the stimulus-based actions during which the object is hefted with
weights (TOP ), and the intention-based actions during which subjects
are required to image that the object is heavier than it is (MIDDLE ). In
this later case, subjects are thus required to voluntarily increase the grip
force to an imaginary level of force sufficient to lift a virtual object.
Force-curves examples are presented (BOTTOM ) illustrating, for a 3-s trial,
the variation of grip force (GF – force applied through the fingers normal to
the object’s surfaces), and the variation of load force (LF – force acting
tangentially to the object’s surfaces). Note that during the REPRODUCE
trials, LF is null, as the object is not lifted off the tabletop. The gray bar
illustrates the GF section that was used to calculate the correlation factors
that are presented in Figure 2.
thus applying only forces normal to the object’s surfaces. After
each pair of trials, the experimenter checked the LF curves to ver-
ify that the subjects had followed instructions, i.e., had not lifted
the object, even slightly, during the REPRODUCE trial. When the
conditions had not been met (LF varied above 0.5 N – see curves
in the bottom panel of Figure 1), the pair of trials was discarded;
the trial was represented to the participant at the end of the block.
The start of each trial was signaled by an auditory beep. The time
interval between the end of the LIFT and the start of the REPRO-
DUCE trials was 1.5 s; the time interval between pairs of trials
was 5 s.
To gain an insight in the role played by the subjects’ mode of
action planning on motor consciousness, two modes of action
planning were proposed. In the stimulus-based mode, subjects
lifted an object that was hefted with a light, a medium-heavy, or
a heavy weight in order to afford objects of 200, 400, and 800 g.
Hence, the level of active GF required to lift the object depended
directly on the levels of passive force induced to the object by the
environment (gravity). In the intention-based mode, the subjects’
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task was to lift the very light object (115 g was the mass of the empty
object) and to imagine that the object was light, medium-heavy, or
heavy. Hence, under this condition, the active GF scaling depended
solely on the force scaling that subjects voluntarily decided to
apply. The order in which the two modes were performed was
randomly assigned to the subjects who then maintained the same
order for the three attention blocks.
To manipulate the quantity of attention resources allocated for
the planning phase of the LIFT trial, subjects performed the task
in three different attention block conditions. In the Neutral con-
dition, subjects performed the LIFT/REPRODUCE pairs of trials
without further constraints. For all participants, this was the first
condition experienced. Then, either a Heightened (A++) or a
Diminished (AA−−) attention block was performed. Under the
Diminished condition, subjects performed a dual task situation
for which they were required to count backward by 7 starting
from a three-digit number (e.g., 231). Subjects were required to
count as fluently as possible at a tempo of 1 countdown per sec-
ond, without making a mistake. This count down procedure was
performed on the LIFT trial only. The REPRODUCE trial was
performed without further constraints. Subjects performed the
countdown in their native language to facilitate the task. In this
study, five MBSR-experts and two controls performed the task
in English. The other participants performed the countdown in
French.
Prior to the Heightened condition, subjects were asked to relax
and become aware of the environmental noises (people walking
in the hallway; water dripping in the pipes; airplane passing) in
order to anchor themselves in the present moment. Then, the
experimenter encouraged all participants to close their eyes and to
use the dominant hand as specific target of meditation on which
to focus attention. If the mind started to wander, subjects were
encouraged to simply direct the mind back toward the object of
attention with a sense of “friendliness”without judgment. A 5-min
meditation program was proposed in order to provide the neces-
sary time for all subjects to become calmer with a slowing down
of breathing rhythm and of discursive thought. Without talking,
when subjects felt ready to pursue, they opened the eyes and the
experimental block was launched.
Subjects performed five pairs of trials for each mass (light;
medium-heavy; heavy), in each action mode (stimulus-based;
intention-based) under each attention condition (neutral; dimin-
ished; heightened) for a total of 90 trials. Prior to the start of the
experimental session, it was emphasized that there would be quite
a large number of trials to perform (a minimum of 100 trials), and
that subjects should relax their grip as best they could to minimize
muscle fatigue during the LIFT trials. Subjects were assigned to one
of the two experimental groups in function of their knowledge in
mindfulness meditation.
At the end of the session, participants were asked to fill in a brief
questionnaire to report on their subjective experience of the dif-
ferent attention conditions. In addition, they were asked to score
between 1 and 10 the accuracy of reproduction of the force level
they thought to have reached, distinguishing between the action
modes as well as the attention conditions. Finally, subjects were
briefed about the overall aim of the experiment and were thanked
for their participation.
DATA ANALYSIS
To describe general performance, mean GF levels applied 1.5 s after
the start of each trial for a 500 ms-duration was calculated. In the
LIFT trials, this time period fell during the time interval for which
the object was held immobile in mid air; in the REPRODUCE tri-
als, this time period fell within the time interval for which subjects
were indicating force levels used in the previous LIFT trial (see
gray horizontal bar in Figure 1 – bottom). To analyze the level
of motor consciousness reached by each subject, Pearson correla-
tion analyses were then conducted between the GF level measured
for each pair of LIFT and REPRODUCE trials. Finally, these cor-
relation measures were submitted to a 3 by 2 repeated measures
Analysis of Variance with Attention (Neutral; Diminished; Height-
ened) and Mode (Stimulus-based vs. Intention-based) as within
subject factors. When required, corrected Scheffé post hoc analyses
were used. The significance level was set at p= 0.05.
RESULTS
All participants performed the motor tasks under the differ-
ent attention conditions without apparent difficulty. They also
expressed pleasurable experiences in the heightened attention con-
dition, reporting having experienced “calmness” and “control”
during the action of lifting.
ANALYSIS OF THE GF LEVELS USED IN THE LIFT TRIALS
Statistical analysis on the mean GF used in the LIFT trials revealed
an absence of Group differences [F(1,42)= 2.725; p= 0.106],with
similar force levels for the controls (14.7 SD 0.7 N) and the MBSR-
experts (12.2 SD 1.4 N). Furthermore, subjects distinguished well
between the three object masses [F(2, 42)= 33.584; p= 0.001].
For all masses, GF levels were slightly higher in the intention-based
mode compared to that observed in the stimulus-based mode
but this slight over estimation did not reach significance [F(1,
42)= 1.186; p= 0.282]. Finally, similar GF levels were used under
the different attention conditions [F(2, 42)= 1.561; p= 0.216].
The detailed values for these results are presented in Table 1.
EFFECTS OF ATTENTION AND PLANNING-MODE ON MOTOR
CONSCIOUSNESS
In the second series of analyses, we considered the correlation
between the GF levels used during the LIFT trial and the motor
judgment that was given by the subjects immediately afterward,
during the REPRODUCE trial. The closeness of fit was taken
as an indicator of the level of motor consciousness reached by
each participant and thus, correlation values were calculated at
an individual level for each experimental condition. A repeated
measures ANOVA was then used to reveal the effects of Mode
(stimulus-based; intention-based) and Attention (Neutral; Dimin-
ished; Heightened) on the levels of motor consciousness in func-
tion of expertise in MBSR meditation techniques. Correlation
values (r2) are reported in % of variance explained, and are
presented in Figure 2A, for the controls and Figure 2B for the
MBSR-experts.
Participants were able to reproduce movement kinetics with
similar force modulation patterns in the LIFT and in the REPRO-
DUCE trials, under all conditions. However, their level of motor
consciousness varied significantly from one individual to another
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Table 1 | Details of the mean results obtained for the grip force levels (in Newton) used for the different action modes and under the different
attention conditions.
Neutral (A) Diminished (A−−) Heightened (A++)
Stimulus Intention Stimulus Intention Stimulus Intention
Light 5.9 (2.8) 5.8 (3.4) 8.8 (3.3) 8.5 (3.3) 5.9 (3.2) 4.6 (3.9)
Medium 10.7 (1.3) 13.7 (1.5) 13.7 (1.5) 13.0 (1.5) 11.7 (1.4) 12.2 (1.7)
Heavy 17.8 (1.5) 23.0 (1.8) 20.0 (1.7) 23.5 (1.7) 20.4 (1.6) 22.3 (2.0)
There were no significant differences between the groups. Thus, results for the 30 participants are presented here averaged together.
A
B
FIGURE 2 | Bar charts of the mean group correlations between the grip
force used on the LIFT trials and the grip force used on the
REPRODUCE-trials. Results are presented in function of action mode and
of experimental groups. (A) Adults with no experience in mindfulness
meditation (Controls; N =20); (B) Adults with daily experience in
mindfulness practice (MBSR-experts; N =10). Stars indicate a significant
difference, at an alpha level set at 0.05.
with correlation values ranging from r2= 43.1% (lowest of the
controls) to r2= 98.9% (the highest of the MBSR-experts). Motor
consciousness was overall greater in the MBSR-experts (r2= 87.4
SD 2.2%) than in the controls (r2= 80.1 SD 4.3%). Results are
thus presented for each group separately in the following section.
For the controls, motor consciousness was similar for the two
action modes [F(1, 38)= 2.302; p= 0.146], and the effect of
attention failed to reach significance [F(1, 38)= 2.807; p= 0.073].
But if anything, motor consciousness was worse in both Height-
ened and Diminished attention conditions compared to that seen
in the Neutral condition (see Figure 2A).
For the MBSR-experts, both the effects of Attention [F(2,
18)= 23.466; p= 0.001] and the interaction Mode×Attention
were significant [F(2, 18)= 7.570; p= 0.004]. In the Neutral con-
dition, motor consciousness was greater in the intention-based
mode (94.6 SD 1.0%) than in the stimulus-based mode (89.5 SD
1.8%). With Heightened attention, motor consciousness in the
stimulus-based mode increased and there was then an absence of
differences between intention-based (97.3 SD 0.9%) and stimulus-
based modes of action planning (97.1 SD 0.5%). This result
suggests that, contrary to the controls, mindfulness-based medita-
tion helped participants increase the level of motor consciousness
even for those actions that were programmed in a more automatic
fashion (see Figure 2B). Finally, the dual task paradigm led to
a significant loss of motor consciousness in both types of action
modes, but the loss was significantly more drastic for those actions
performed in the intention-based mode (70.4 SD 4.4%) than those
planned in the stimulus-based mode (82.1 SD 4.3%). Under this
Diminished condition, motor consciousness was of similar degree
in the controls and the MBSR-experts.
SELF-EVALUATION OF MOTOR CONSCIOUSNESS
When asked to provide a self-evaluation of their capabilities to per-
form the REPRODUCE trials, all subjects thought that they had
performed under the stimulus-based mode rather well (7/10 on a
Likert-type rating scale; range 5–9). All subjects reported having
great doubts for those trials performed under the intention-based
mode (3/10 on a Likert-type rating scale; range 2–5). For the effects
of attention, the self-evaluation reports followed a similar pattern
of results in both experimental groups. Whatever the level in MBSR
meditation technique, participants thought to have done worse
in the Diminished condition and best in the Heightened condi-
tion. To note, is the fact that professional musicians (N = 12) were
those who were overall the most accurate in the self-evaluation
exercise.
These results suggest that whatever the level of MBSR-expertise,
one can reach a certain degree of motor consciousness of move-
ment kinetics without being self confident about the accuracy of
the judgment. These findings suggest a pre-reflective nature to
the mechanism and stress furthermore the importance of using
non-verbal tasks to investigate levels of consciousness reached for
motor-sensory body experiences.
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DISCUSSION
Considering the pre-reflective nature of body experiences, reports
in the literature have defended the idea that only limited aspects
of motor acts can be consciously perceived. Nevertheless, when
using appropriate methods, i.e., non-verbal, it was possible here
to show that individuals have in fact access to a significant extent
of the motor-sensory content of motor actions. Our main find-
ings are that (1) with free allocation of attention (neutral con-
dition), adult individuals can remarkably reproduce force levels
that are automatically scaled to an object’s weight. (2) The level of
motor consciousness is severely impaired when attention is with-
drawn. (3) Increasing the focus of top-down attention (heightened
condition) does not increase motor consciousness in controls;
on the contrary, in the case of automatic motor adjustments
(stimulus-based actions), increased top-down attention can hin-
der the emergence of body awareness. (4) Contrasting results are
obtained for mindfulness experts with enhanced motor conscious-
ness under Heightened focus of attention for motor adjustments
that were both voluntarily (intention-based) and automatically
scaled (stimulus-based). These later results suggest that MBSR
meditation is not simply an increased state of attention but may
also play on the threshold of conscious perception for bottom-up
motor-sensory information. In the following sections, we detail
these results by considering the role of attention, intention, and
mindfulness meditation, respectively in the theoretical context of
a tripartite model of consciousness.
AN IMPLICIT MEASURE TO EVALUATE MOTOR CONSCIOUSNESS
Motor consciousness is by definition an “inner subjective state”
(Searle, 2000) and thus, “it is not directly accessible from a third
person viewpoint.” Following this idea, we asked subjects to focus
on the dynamical rather than on the observational aspect of
their motor output. The basic assumption of such a reproduction
paradigm was that the movement characteristics that can be repro-
duced are those of which we are aware of, at a pre-reflective level,
and that the modulation of attention resources will help emerge to
consciousness only those body motor-sensory experiences, which
possess a constructed representational content.
With freely oriented attention (neutral condition), participants
were able to reproduce the force levels used with correlations (r2)
greater than 70% of total variance. This observation indicated that
the reproduction task was based on a true content of body experi-
ence. It has been assumed in the literature that subjects’ perceptual
awareness (their explicit knowledge of action goal) is equivalent to
their motor awareness (their explicit knowledge of their physical
response – for further discussion, see Coello and Delevoye-Turrell,
2007; Johnson et al., 2002). But, this is not the case as we demon-
strated in the present study that all subjects had good reproduction
capabilities without explicit knowledge of action outcome. This
important result confirms a previous study that also used manual
responses to assess motor consciousness more accurately (Johnson
and Haggard, 2005).
THE IMPORTANCE OF ATTENTION FOR MOTOR CONSCIOUSNESS
Our findings confirmed the hypothesis that attention resources are
required to reach good levels of motor consciousness. In a dual task
paradigm, subjects were required to perform a cognitive highly
demanding count down task while preparing and performing the
lift action. GF levels were reproduced with greater errors under
this dual task condition (70–75%) compared to that observed
under the single task condition (85–95%). These results suggest
that attention allocation during action preparation and execution
is required in order to access the content of body motor-sensory
experiences, at a later moment. Without these cognitive resources,
one loses in our simple case up to 25% of information content.
This may explain why pathologies associated to attention deficits
are often characterized by abnormal conscious experiences, e.g.,
schizophrenia (Davie and Freeman, 1961; Sass and Parnas, 2003;
Voss et al., 2010) and bipolar patients (Bartolomeo, 2007; Lanyon
and Denham, 2010).
Interestingly, and contrary to that hypothesized, subjects did
not take advantage of the augmented attention allocation for bet-
ter motor consciousness. If anything, augmented attention lead
to a decrease in the accuracy of force reproduction. These results
confirmed the conclusions reached in many sports oriented studies
that declare that motor routines must be learned and performed
without attention allocated to motor planning (Forkstam and
Petersson, 2005; Janacsek and Nemeth, 2012). As such, it has been
established that attention must be geared to external goals for
high motor performance in order to maintain all attention away
from those brain mechanism that automatically organize and exe-
cute action sequences (Wulf and Prinz, 2001; Wulf et al., 2010a).
Hence, heightened attention for motor planning – through for
example MBSR meditation techniques – may not be adequate for
those actions that depend on brain processes that are by nature
automatic and unconscious.
MOTOR CONSCIOUSNESS DEPENDS ON THE INTENTIONAL STATE OF
ACTION PLANNING
It is the case that the negative effect of heightened attention on
motor consciousness was observed in the controls only for those
actions that required an automatic scaling of GF, on the basis of the
true weight of the object, i.e., for stimulus-based planned actions
(Figure 2A). Indeed, in those cases for which force scaling was
set on the basis of an intentional and explicit motor goal, aug-
mented attention to the task-preparation and execution did not
interfere with the overall process; The content of body experiences
was accessed in the following trial as well as that observed in the
neutral condition. These results confirm that (1) the mechanisms
for the planning and execution of motor actions are of a different
nature depending on the intentional state of the subjects and that
(2) attention to action will have a different effect on motor con-
sciousness depending on the explicit level in which the performer
is engaged.
Other studies have also reported that the degree of motor con-
sciousness depends on the subjects’ intentional state (Castiello
et al., 1991; Beilock et al., 2002, 2006). For example, using a
movement reproduction paradigm in a double-step pointing task,
Johnson et al. (2002) had subjects follow a target (pointing ) or vol-
untarily move in the opposite direction (anti-pointing ). After each
initial trial, an indicator of the subjects’ awareness was obtained
by asking subjects to reproduce the movement they thought they
had previously executed. Results confirmed that subjects were able
to make rapid corrections to an ongoing pointing movement, in
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response to a target shift. For anti-pointing trials, the corrections
occurred later than the corrections toward the target in stan-
dard pointing. This pattern of results is consistent with the idea
that two different mechanisms are involved: (1) a relatively slow
neuronal circuit via the frontal cortices for intentional corrections,
(2) a faster parietal connection for automatic corrections (Day and
Lyon, 2000).
The interesting finding however was that subjects were able to
perceive and reproduce the trajectories of the pointing corrections
even in absence of a conscious perception of a target shift, indi-
cating once more a significant different between perceptual and
motor consciousness. In addition, there was a net difference in the
quality of the content of motor awareness. Indeed, for standard
pointing (automatic pointing), subjects systematically underesti-
mated their correction-capabilities, with important time delays
(>30 ms) and diminished awareness of the spatial characteristics
of the correction. In contrast, for the anti-pointing trials (inten-
tional pointing), subjects reproduced the corrections close to that
truly performed with very little awareness time-delay. Thus, sub-
jects had a better conscious recollection of those corrections made
in the intention-based mode of action correction. Our findings
lead to a similar conclusion but in the force domain of motor con-
trol, during a highly ecological task of manipulating an object with
a precision grip. Hence, it is possible to suggest a generalization
principle that subjects possess different levels of motor conscious-
ness of their body in action, depending upon the nature of the
planning-mode used to prepare and execute that action. More
specifically, intention-based actions would be sub-conscious but
would be more accessible to a conscious state of processing than
the more automatically triggered movements.
MINDFULNESS IS NOT ALLOCATION OF ATTENTION TO THE CONTENT
OF BODY EXPERIENCES
An often-cited definition of mindfulness is paying attention in
a particular way : on purpose, in the present moment and non-
judgmentally (Kabat-Zinn, 1994). It has been proposed that this
definition embodies three principle axioms (Shapiro et al., 2006):
(1) on purpose or intention, (2) paying attention or attention,
(3) in a particular way or attitude. As such, intention, attention,
and attitude would be three interwoven aspects of a single cyclic
process and would occur simultaneously. Mindfulness would be
this moment-to-moment process. Very little work has been geared
to the proposal of a comprehensive theoretical model of what
happens under mindfulness meditation. Nevertheless, Hölzel and
collaborators have recently proposed that mindfulness meditation
would play upon several components and would especially change
the cortical relation between (1) the anterior cingulated cortex for
attention regulation (Hölzel et al., 2007) and (2) gray matter con-
centration in the temporo-parietal junction (Hölzel et al., 2011),
which may modify the levels of body awareness.
Experimentally, meditation has shown to provide individuals
with the capacity to increase cognitive resources both in healthy
subjects (Jain et al., 2007; van den Hurk et al., 2010) and in patho-
logical patients (Britton et al., 2010; Crane-Okada et al., 2012).
Meditation has also revealed to increase body awareness (Kerr
et al., 2008). In the present study, results are in line with these
general ideas and showed that already in the neutral condition,
participants with high experience in MBSR meditation techniques
revealed greater capacities in reproducing a force level than those
who had no meditation expertise.
Interestingly, even for MBSR-experts, when attention resources
were reduced through dual task manipulation, subjects revealed
weaker levels of motor consciousness than that measured in the
neutral condition. This effect was drastic for the intention-based
mode that impaired motor awareness to such an extent that
controls and MBSR-experts revealed similar levels of motor con-
sciousness under this condition only. Finally, in the heightened
attention condition. Results revealed that the effect of paying atten-
tion in a particular way increased motor consciousness both in the
intention-based mode and in the stimulus-based mode of action
planning. This was possible to such an extent that performances
reached almost perfection, with correlation values being all over
90%, and reaching 99% in 2 of the participants. It would now be
important in forthcoming studies to further confirm the present
results (1) by testing a larger group of meditation experts and (2)
by controlling the type and level of meditation expertise developed
on a daily basis.
In the final section, we discuss our results in the light of a
possible neuro-cognitive model that may help gain a better under-
standing of the contrasting effects of attention and meditation on
motor consciousness.
A TRIPARTITE MODEL TO EXPLAIN THE EFFECTS OF MEDITATION ON
THE EMERGENCE OF SUBLIMINAL SENSORY INFORMATION
Instead of the classical binary separation between non-conscious
and conscious processing, Dehaene et al. (2006) introduced a
tripartite distinction between subliminal, preconscious, and con-
scious processing. More specifically, the key idea is that, within
non-conscious states, it makes a major difference whether the
stimuli invisibility is due to a limitation in bottom-up stimulus
strength, or by the temporary withdrawal of top-down attention.
The first case corresponds to subliminal processing; the second
to preconscious processing. Following this idea, motor conscious-
ness would be the resultant of the interaction between bottom-up
mechanism for body sensations (depending on the strength of
motor-sensory content) and the amount of top-down attention
allocated to the task, at a given moment in time.
It has been proposed that the subliminal level of processing
(etymologically “below the threshold”) would be a condition for
which information is inaccessible to consciousness because this
bottom-up activation is insufficient to trigger a large-scale rever-
berating state, in a global network of neurons, with long-range
axons. The preconscious level would be a neural process that
potentially carries enough activation for conscious access, but
is temporarily buffered in a non-conscious store because of a
lack of top-down attentional amplification, e.g., owing to tran-
sient occupancy of the central workspace system during dual
task conditions (Sigman and Dehaene, 2005, 2008). Even strong
sensory stimuli could remain temporarily preconscious. With top-
down attention focus, these preconscious stimuli could become
conscious and thus, be explicitly reported by a subject. At the
neurocomputational level, preconscious processing is proposed
to involve resonant loops within medium range connections,
which maintain the representation of a motor-sensory content
temporarily active in a sensory buffer for a few hundred millisec-
onds. A preconscious stimulus might ultimately achieve conscious
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FIGURE 3 | Schematic illustration of the differentiated role of
top-down and bottom-up attention for movement planning and
execution. Different levels of motor-sensory content are proposed in this
tripartite model of motor consciousness. At the subliminal level, subjects
have no access to the motor-sensory content; through allocation of
bottom-up attention, information is transferred from the subliminal to the
pre-conscious level of motor consciousness. The information available at
this pre-conscious level can be transferred to the conscious level through
the allocation of top-down resources. It is further proposed that MBSR
expertise can enhance motor consciousness through two different
mechanisms: increased synergies for more information transfer from
subliminal to pre-conscious levels: better attention focus for lower threshold
levels of conscious report.
access once the central workspace is freed. It might however
never gain access to conscious processing if the preconscious
buffer is erased before receiving sufficient top-down attention. An
illustration of this tripartite distinction is proposed in Figure 3.
We propose that the experimental data reported in the present
study can be placed within this framework of consciousness. For
actions performed in the stimulus-based mode, GF is automat-
ically scaled to the object weight. Little bottom-up attention is
geared to the task and thus, motor-sensory afferences from the
gripping fingers arrive and remain primarily in the subliminal
state. When during the REPRODUCE trial, subjects try to indicate
the level of GF used in the previous LIFT trial, large reproduc-
ing errors are performed because little motor-sensory content has
reached levels of explicit motor consciousness, even after focusing
top-down attention to the task. This mechanism would explain
why subjects know that they are agent of the action, and they
know what final goal they achieved (“I lifted the object to this
height”) but they have very little sensation content of the act-
ing fingers upon the object. Because of the automaticity of the
gripping action, with heightened top-down attention, large inter-
feres occur between top-down and bottom-up attentional systems,
which in turn affects the transition of motor-sensory information
from subliminal to the preconscious state of processing.
For actions performed in the intention-based mode, top-down
attention is used to scale voluntarily the GF levels in accor-
dance to the internal representation of the weight of the imagi-
nary object. In this case, in addition to bottom-up attention for
muscle activation, top-down attention is also used to maintain a
vivid representation to guide action planning and execution. This
double attention activity would allow for a rich motor-sensory
content to be buffered in the preconscious level of processing. With
larger and more precise content, the REPRODUCE trial would be
performed more accurately. As confirmed by our data, the height-
ened attention condition may not change performance outcome
as top-down attention is allocated to the task whether explicitly
through instruction or implicitly due to task demands. In the
present study, the absence of differences in the controls between
motor consciousness for intention and stimulus-based actions in
the neutral condition may be due to the simplicity of the grip-
ping task. Hence, our interpretations need now to be verified by
replicating the present findings in a larger sample group and espe-
cially, using a more complex task that associates new experiences
of whole body movements.
Finally, the power of meditation would lie within the possi-
bility to increase both types of attention in order to optimize the
quantity and quality of motor-sensory content. For the bottom-up
circuit, meditation would lead to increased synergies during mus-
cle activation,which in turn would code sensations directly into the
preconscious level of information processing. As such, movements
that are planned in the stimulus-based mode would be associated
to sensory contents that are as vivid than that obtained for those
actions planned intentionally. With more focused energies in the
top-down areas of the brain, a lowering of the threshold level
of conscious report could in addition occur in the most experts
(Figure 3 – right), leading to a global level of motor consciousness
close to perfection. Using a combination of attention paradigms,
Jensen et al. (2012) have recently suggested a similar interpretation
of MBSR-enhancement in reaction time based measures.
CONCLUSION
The results reported here confirm that mindfulness increases the
sensory experiences of body during motor action execution. The
intentional state in which the action is produced plays an impor-
tant role in the level of motor consciousness that subjects can
achieve. This is probably due to the fact that intention-based
actions require that plan-related representations be internally gen-
erated. With more top-down attention, greater amounts of sensory
information are buffered at a preconscious level of motor-sensory
processing. As described in the tripartite model of conscious-
ness (Dehaene et al., 2006), top-down attention would play the
role of an amplifier of bottom-up sensations that remain nev-
ertheless preconscious in most everyday activities. Meditation
techniques significantly enhance bottom-up sensory information
processing of ongoing movements, enabling sensory informa-
tion to transfer directly from subliminal to preconscious levels
of the brain. When top-down attention is then directed toward
these preconscious senses of body experiences, total conscious-
ness of our body in action can emerge for even the simplest of
movements.
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